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Abstract 
Russia is one of the most dangerous countries for journalists and the conflict with 
Ukraine and Russia’s involvement in Syria present even further challenges for the 
future of Russian journalism. In addition to the financial pressures, physical 
attacks, abductions and harassment, liberal journalists now face an increasing 
threat to the democratising role they see themselves as playing. President Vladimir
Putin’s soaring popularity and the elaborate range of tactics used to suppress press
freedom are forcing liberal media to rethink their mission(s) and identity(ies). This
paper presents empirical evidence on the range of tactics used by Russian 
authorities as well as the coping strategies adopted by journalists. The study 
shows that some Russian media and journalists demonstrate a great degree of 
resilience in their efforts to expose wrongdoings and hold the powerful to account. 
The article questions the applicability of Western-centric normative media system 
theories because it shows that the breadth, depth, and mechanisms of control in 
modern-day Russia are very different from the ones used during Soviet times, and 
yet, Russian media and society do not appear to be on a linear journey from 
authoritarianism to democracy. The article presents the findings of a semi-
ethnographic study of some of Russia’s most influential liberal news outlets – 
Novaya Gazeta, Radio Echo of Moscow and Radio Free Europe/Liberty. The study 
was conducted in May 2014 in the midst of the conflict with Ukraine. It involved 
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observations of editorial meetings, documentary analysis and interviews with 
editors, deputy editors and journalists. 
 
Keywords: liberal media, journalism, neo-authoritarianism, media systems, press 
freedom, Russia, Ukraine, Vladimir Putin 
Introduction 
 
Russia is one of the most dangerous countries for journalists and the conflict with 
Ukraine and Russia’s controversial role in Syria present even further challenges for 
the future of Russian journalism. Although Russia is not involved in an armed 
conflict within its territory, it has been ranked among the top 10 countries with the 
highest number of murdered journalists since 1992 (Committee to Protect 
Journalists, 2015; Azhgikhina, 2007). The country is classified as ‘not free’ by 
Freedom House.1 President Vladimir Putin’s tightening grip on Russian media 
includes a range of overt and covert practices of censorship, persecution and 
harassment of journalists who voice alternative views, and a great degree of self-
censorship. In addition to the financial pressures, physical attacks, abductions and 
harassment, liberal journalists face an increasing threat to the democratising role 
they see themselves as playing. Freedom House (2015) states that ‘Russia’s 
occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and involvement in the conflict in eastern 
Ukraine helped to drive an increase in propagandistic content’ and ‘tighter 
restrictions on dissenting views.’ Only a few media outlets strive to voice critical 
concerns about the role of the state in this climate of propaganda and self-
censorship but their efforts come at a price. Putin’s soaring popularity and the 
elaborate range of tactics used to suppress press freedom are forcing liberal media 
to rethink their mission(s) and identity(ies). This study shows liberal journalists’ 
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bravery and resilience in the face of multiple challenges. The article will focus on 
some of Russia’s most influential liberal national news outlets – ‘the deadliest’ 
newspaper Novaya Gazeta, ‘Russia’s last independent radio station’ Radio Echo of 
Moscow (Ekho) and US Congress-funded Radio Free Europe/Liberty (Svoboda). The 
fieldwork was completed in May 2014 in the midst of the conflict with Ukraine. It 
involved observations of editorial meetings, documentary analysis and interviews 
with editors, deputy editors and journalists. Subsequent interviews were conducted
at a time when Russia’s role on the world stage was becoming increasingly 
controversial. This paper presents empirical evidence on the main tactics used by 
Russian authorities as well as the coping strategies adopted by journalists. While 
events and developments in these outlets have attracted some patchy media 
coverage in the West, no known academic study provides an account of the recent 
challenges and pressures they face. Most studies about Russian media are based on 
textual analysis of newspaper articles (e.g. Heinrich & Tanaev, 2009; von Seth 2012)
or discuss the role of state-run TV stations (e.g. Burrett, 2011; Oates, 2006) or the 
Internet (Oates, 2013). By contrast, this article offers a unique ethnographic insight 
into the daily pressures and challenges Russian liberal journalists face. It also 
questions the applicability of Western-centric normative media system theories by 
showing that ‘the breadth, depth, and mechanisms of control’ (Becker, 2014: 202) in
modern-day Russia are different from the ones used during Soviet times, and yet, 
Russian media and society do not appear to be on a linear journey from 
authoritarianism to democracy. While a number of scholars, NGOs and activists 
have described the challenges Russian media face, very few, if any, studies provide 
journalists’ first-hand accounts or ethnographic observations of the difficulties 
experienced by media critical of the regime. 
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Russian media’s thorny road to democratisation
Russia is not involved in an armed conflict within its territory and yet the number 
of murdered journalists is very high. It has been ranked among the top 10 
countries with the highest number of murdered journalists since 1992 and has a 
poor impunity record (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2015). Key reasons are 
‘the lack of political will to investigate the murders’ and the ‘lack of coordination 
and cooperation’ between editorial offices and the authorities (Azhgikhina, 2007: 
1248). Novaya Gazeta is labelled as the deadliest newspaper with six murders, 
including the assassination of the famous investigative reporter Anna 
Politkovskaya on Putin’s birthday in 2006. The evidence suggests that 
Politkovskaya’s murder was related to her investigations about Chechnya. 
Nonetheless, the President’s reaction to her death was indicative of his attitude to 
liberal media. He said: ‘Her death caused more damage to the country than her 
articles’ (Azhgikhina, 2007: 1259). 
Russian media’s road to democratisation has not only been thorny but also 
appears to have taken a turn for the worse. Although ‘freedom of speech was the 
first and perhaps the only real achievement of perestroika’, it was later ‘shaken, 
and then lost’ (Azhgikhina, 2007: 1249). The Kremlin has a tight grip on most 
broadcast media, especially TV. The main national TV networks are under state 
control and the state ‘has also found “administrative means” to get a grip on the 
coverage’ of private stations, so ‘all TV stations now carefully adhere to the official 
line, and hear very quickly from the Kremlin if they wander off message’ (Brenton,
2011: 35). The press has ‘more latitude, largely because they are seen as less 
important’ and while ‘there is no formal censorship, Kremlin “guidance” is 
abundantly available’ (Brenton, 2011: 35). Most newspapers are owned by major 
companies such as the state gas giant Gazprom, which are ‘heavily dependent on 
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their links with the Kremlin for their day-to-day activities, and will be careful that 
their journalistic protégés do not endanger those links’ (Brenton, 2011, 36). The 
Kremlin also notoriously closed down or hacked a few opposition websites 
recently. Despite much speculation about the potential role of the Russian Internet
(Runet), the title of Oates’s (2013) book tellingly describes its current state: 
Revolution Stalled: The Political Limits of the Internet in the Post-Soviet Sphere. 
While Runet provides a platform for alternative voices, it gives ‘faint hope for 
online mobilization in Russia’ (Oates, 2017). 
In this environment of censorship and self-censorship, only a few media 
strive to remain independent from state influence and voice critical concerns 
about the authorities. It is, therefore, very important to explore the role of 
influential liberal media. Novaya Gazeta is famous for its investigations of 
corruption practices and strong criticism of Putin and the Kremlin. Brenton 
(2011) argues that it is ‘the most effective of the opposition newspapers’ (p. 37). 
Brown (2009, 48) claims it is ‘the most independent and boldly critical of Moscow
newspapers’. Similarly, Ekho is given as an example of the only ‘free radio station’ 
that is ‘allowed to survive as a glorious reminder of the openness and 
disputatiousness that Russian broadcasting enjoyed at its zenith’ (Brenton, 2011: 
35). What makes the radio ‘unique’ is its editorial independence and its ‘history of
antagonistic relations with Kremlin rulers’ (Baysha, 2014). Putin was quoted as 
saying to the editor-in-chief Alexey Venediktov: ‘You pour diarrhoea over me day 
and night’ (Baysha, 2014). Baysha (2014) also argues that Ekho’s independence 
‘appears paradoxical when one considers that Echo is owned by Gazprom’. A 
German journalist explains: 1. ‘The Kremlin can point to Echo whenever countries
in the West criticize press freedoms in Russia.’ 2. ‘Even as the station is held in 
high regard by the country’s intelligentsia, it has little influence over the voting 
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masses’ (Baysha, 2014). Similar claims are made about Novaya Gazeta and 
Svoboda. From broadcasting illegally during communism, the US-funded radio 
station is now allowed to officially operate – their headquarters are still in Prague
but they have a big office in the centre of Moscow. Svoboda played an important 
ideological role during the Cold War. Puddington (2000: ix) writes that it ‘was 
arguably the most influential politically oriented international radio station in 
history’. While the radio station withdrew its operations from most East 
European countries, Russia remains a priority. Despite its clear ideological 
agenda, it appeared to have played a democratizing role during communism 
(Johnson, 2010).  
Free media are indeed a backbone of any democracy so a country’s 
journey to democracy cannot be complete without the development of strong 
independent media. A key question this paper addresses is: to what extent do 
Russian authorities allow journalists who strive towards editorial independence 
from the state to freely operate and what range of techniques do they use? A 
follow-up question is: what coping strategies do journalists resort to? Although 
they share similar values, the three media outlets differ significantly in some 
aspects – especially in terms of ownership and funding. The inclusion of different 
media will allow us to better capture the range of mechanisms of media control 
and management and the respective coping techniques. 
Towards a conceptualization of the Russian media system
Although there have been a few notable attempts towards operationalization of the 
Russian media system (de Smaele, 1999, 2009; Koltsova, 2006; Becker, 2014; Oates,
2006; 2013; Vartanova, 2012), as Rollberg (2014: 175) argues, it is very hard, ‘if not
impossible to arrive at a lasting analytical consensus about the post-Soviet media 
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sphere’, because ‘media in post-Soviet societies are a moving target, influenced by 
technological, geopolitical, and cultural developments’. This difficulty is in large 
part due to the fact that researchers often use Western concepts and theories 
(Koltsova, 2006). The ‘undifferentiated use’ of terms such as censorship, self-
censorship and transition is problematic because of two key reasons (Rollberg, 
2014). First, they reinforce the Cold War dichotomy between the East and the West,
democratic countries and totalitarian regimes (Burrett, 2011; Rollberg, 2014). This 
reinforcement is based on the assumption that after 1989/1990 Russian society 
and media have been in a period of transition from communism/ authoritarianism 
to democracy (Burrett, 2011; Rollberg, 2014). Even if this was indeed the case 
during and shortly after the perestroika and glasnost years, recent developments 
show this is hardly the case anymore. Both Kolstova (2006) and Oates (2013) 
question the extent to which Russian society and media were ever on a linear 
journey towards democratization. Koltsova (2006) claims that the Russian 
experience demonstrates that ‘the authoritarianism-democracy axis is not the only 
one along which societies can change’ (p. 5).  She proposes a move away from 
normative theories of democracy to an agency-focused approach whereby ‘the 
struggle between different power centres’ is investigated in more depth by focusing
on ‘power agents, resources, strategies and rules’ (Koltsova, 2006: 5-6, 227). 
Second, the terminology is problematic because ‘the exact meaning of these 
notions can no longer be “taken for granted”’ since they ‘originated from 
totalitarian society models”’ (Rollberg, 2014: 176). Rollberg (2014) demonstrates 
that none of Siebert et al.’s (1956) four theories of the press fully operationalises 
the situation in Russia. Although on the surface it appears that post-Soviet media 
have undergone an evolution from a Social Responsibility model to an 
Authoritarian model in the early 2000s, ‘even in the most liberal years of glasnost, 
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Soviet media retained essential features of what Siebert called ‘the Soviet model,’ 
and even in the most intrusive years of the Putin presidency (2002-2003, after 
2012), the Authoritarian model contains libertarian and consumer-driven features’ 
(Rollberg, 2014: 175). Oates (2013: 12) adds that Siebert et al.’s (1956) Soviet 
model explained well how the media worked in Soviet times but even during the 
glasnost years, the media ‘failed to transform itself from a platform for political 
players to a voice of the citizens.’ While diversity developed, ‘the idea of the media 
as objective or balanced has never been widely adopted’ (Oates, 2013: 12). 
This suggests that developments in Russia should not be interpreted 
through Western lenses and with existing (predominantly normative) Western 
theories and concepts. Instead, commentators (Becker, 2014; Pomerantsev, 2014) 
claim that Russia has embarked on a slightly different journey. Koltsova’s (2006) 
power-focused model goes some way towards explaining who the key actors in the 
process are. Becker (2014: 191) concludes that Russia has ‘adopted a neo-
authoritarian media system that has more in common with similar non-democratic 
systems around the world than with the Soviet system’. Similarly, Pomerantsev 
(2014: 42) argues that ‘this isn’t a country in transition but some form of 
postmodern dictatorship that uses the language and institutions of democratic 
capitalism for authoritarian ends’. de Smaele (1999: 186) says that due to its unique
geographical position and the relevant cultural implications, the Russian model 
might be interpreted as a Eurasian model. However, in later work she (de Smaele, 
2009) suggests that although the Russian media model cannot be classified under 
any existing models, it is ‘within reach’ of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) Polarised 
Pluralist Model. Vartanova (2012: 140-142) also writes of a ‘synergy of Western 
and Asian elements’ and labels the Russian media system as ‘statist 
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commercialized’ because of the centrality of the state and the growing 
commercialisation. 
A few notable features of the contemporary Russian media system are of 
relevance: 1. The types of control and the role of ideology. 2. The role of journalists 
and audiences’ expectations. The role of ideology significantly diminished in the 
post-Soviet years and ‘sanctioned diversity’ was allowed, namely the ruling elite 
tolerated the existence of critical press content (Becker, 2004: 55). Overall, the 
types of control in modern-day Russia are very different from the Soviet era 
(Becker, 2014). While journalists have much more freedom to ‘speak out against the
state or political leadership in some media…the center of political power has 
employed a wider array of techniques to gradually reclaim control’ (Becker, 2014: 
202). Moreover, this system of control is very ‘chaotic’ so it is not always clear what 
the consequences of speaking out will be, which leads to an overall uncertainty that
‘creates significant disincentives for journalists to challenge the state or press the 
limits of what it (or anxious owners) will tolerate’ (Becker, 2014: 202). This 
‘institutionalized uncertainty’ is coupled up with market pressures, which did not 
exist during communism (Becker, 2014: 202). This study presents empirical 
evidence on the controls and restrictions that Russian liberal journalists face and it 
investigates the extent to which Becker (2014) is right in claiming that ‘the breadth,
depth, and mechanisms of control’ (p. 202) are different. However, it is important to
recognize that the state continues to play a key role in the suppression of press 
freedom, which precludes the potential for drawing meaningful parallels with 
democratic countries. In Becker’s (2014: 203) view, ‘there may be a variety of 
sources of power, but the state retains the greatest potential to encroach upon 
media autonomy, limit pluralism, unleash violence, and turn the media into a tool of
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political manipulation’. This places journalists and citizens in ‘a disadvantageous 
position’ (Becker, 2014: 203). 
Having said that, Kolstova (2006) advises against viewing media 
representatives as innocent victims at the hands of the state because they are ‘no 
less power maximizers than anybody else’. Oates (2013: 12) argues that ‘all 
segments of Russian society, from politicians to the public to the journalists 
themselves, perceive the mass media as a political player rather than as a watchdog 
that can provide a check on political power for the interest of citizens.’ She claims 
that Russia has never been ‘a developing democracy’, because it has not developed 
genuine democratic institutions nor a fourth estate in the media (Oates, 2013: 13). 
Oates’s (2006; 2013) and Kolstova (2006)’s studies suggest the majority of 
journalists do not strive to be watchdogs and their attitude has been ‘most 
destructive’ (Oates, 2006: 192). Similarly, Schimpfossl and Yablokov (2014: 295) 
show that those TV journalists ‘who are involved in the direct promotion of Kremlin
positions usually have consciously and deliberately chosen to do so.’ This article 
also reveals whether liberal journalists see themselves as political players.
Methods
This is a qualitative study based on 20 long interviews with journalists, editors 
and deputy editors, ethnographic observations of editorial meetings and 
documentary analysis. Most of the fieldwork was completed in Moscow in May 
2014 but interviews were conducted before and after that as well. All interviews 
were fully transcribed and thematically analysed, namely ‘the data are read for 
analytical themes’ (Fielding, 2001: 159). Braun and Clarke (2006) argue that 
thematic analysis is one of the most flexible and widely-used qualitative 
methods. They praise the method for its theoretical freedom and the fact that it 
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provides ‘a rich and detailed, yet complex account of data’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006:
78).  A grounded theory approach - the constant bottom-up comparison method 
- was adopted (Glaser 1965, Dye et al., 2000).  The analysis consisted of ‘at least 
two phases: initial and focused coding’ (Charmaz, 2006: 42). In the first stage, 
‘fragments of data – words, lines, segments, and incidents’ were examined 
‘closely for their analytical import’ (Charmaz, 2006: 42). After the initial 
identification of emerging themes, decisions were made ‘about which initial 
codes make the most analytical sense to categorise’ the ‘data incisively and 
completely’ (Charmaz, 2006, p. 57). These initial themes were therefore further 
refined and categorized under broader categories.
The three media outlets were chosen because they are among the most 
prominent and influential liberal media in Russia. Access was easily arranged to 
Novaya Gazeta and Svoboda but it was more difficult to get access to Ekho. I was 
allowed to interview any journalists of my choice in Novaya Gazeta and Svoboda 
and to attend all meetings (formal and informal), but the editor-in-chief of Ekho 
pre-arranged all interviews for me and I was not allowed to freely move in the 
building. I aimed for a theoretical sample with both senior and junior journalists 
and at least one editor or deputy editor in each medium. My research was 
constrained by time and staff availability but I achieved a fairly varied sample at 
Novaya Gazeta and Radio Liberty. Given the exploratory and qualitative nature of 
the study, I was not aiming for representativeness. Moreover, the empirical work 
was conducted at an eventful time, namely at the peak of the conflict in Ukraine, so
while the interviews covered a range of general questions, the coverage of Ukraine 
dominated the agenda of the meetings observed. Participants were given the 
option to remain anonymous but most of them (bar one) waived their anonymity 
(or in fact strongly objected against it). Some of the interviews were conducted in 
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English and some in Russian. The original wording of the interviews conducted in 
English has been preserved. The project received ethical approval both from my 
institution and from the Moscow Lomonosov State University.
Tactics used to suppress liberal media 
The evidence suggest that journalists are not allowed to freely operate in the 
country and three main types of tactics are used to suppress their work: business 
pressures, threats and attacks, and legal measures.
Business pressures
The business pressures are either ownership-related or market-related, including 
pressure on advertisers. The ownership-related pressures apply to Novaya Gazeta 
and Ekho because the US Congress funds Svoboda. Novaya Gazeta was founded by a
group of journalists and the majority shares (51%) are in the hands of the editorial
staff (Prusenkova, 2014, personal communication). Russian oligarch Alexander 
Lebedev, who also owns The Independent and The London Evening Standard, is a 
main shareholder (39%). Former President Mikhail Gorbachev owns the final 
10%.
At the time of fieldwork most journalists reported that Lebedev had 
announced he would no longer fund the paper after his troubles with the 
authorities. The Head of Press Service Nadezhda Prusenkova (2014, personal 
communication) explained that Lebedev’s bank was embroiled in a corruption 
scandal involving the Federal Service Bureau (previously KGB): ‘It was a big 
scandal and he lost his business. It was a story of revenge on the side of the secret 
service’. Lebedev is a former KGB agent. 
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Lebedev announced in a press interview that he would remain a 
shareholder, but he would stop ‘bankrolling’ the paper because ‘of the expense 
and the strain’. He explained to The Times (2015) he wanted ‘some respite’, ‘some 
time with the kids’ and that he had been ‘left alone’ after withdrawing his 
financial support. This withdrawal exacerbated the newspaper’s financial 
situation and led to an unprecedented announcement by its editor that they might
have to stop issuing the print edition. 
Prusenkova (2014, personal communication) recalled a time when
Lebedev ‘saved’ the newspaper. ‘He supported us at a time when we were on the 
ground. He saved us. He really saved us.’ The other shareholder – Gorbachev
– has also financially helped them on a few occasions. Journalists
recalled how he paid their salaries and bought new computers. However, 
Gorbachev’s health condition had deteriorated and he does not currently 
support the newspaper. 
The financial and personal woes of the newspaper owners are not the only
problem. A key contributing factor is the lack of advertising. Prusenkova showed 
me the most recent edition with only one advertisement in it. She claimed they 
could not attract any advertising because they were ‘independent.’ The situation 
was different during Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidency. The first interview he gave 
as President was for Novaya Gazeta and big business saw this ‘as a sign’: ‘There 
are always signs and after this sign we had many, many commercials’ 
(Prusenkova, 2014, personal communication). By contrast, when Putin embarked
on his second term as President, he immediately convened a meeting with ‘big 
business representatives.’ ‘They were told there were a few media they are not 
allowed to advertise in. And we were at the important first place – always first 
place’, Prusenkova said. She gave an example of a drinks’ company they had 
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signed a one-year contract with. After the meeting with Putin, the company 
decided to withdraw any future advertisements without asking for a refund. 
Prusenkova (2014, personal communication) claimed most companies ‘want a 
positive context’ and ‘fear to connect with us’.
Ekho’s story is not dissimilar. The radio station was also founded by 
journalists and has long been renown for giving voice to critical views about Putin 
and the Kremlin. The majority shares were eventually bought by Gazprom-Media 
and ever since numerous attempts have been made to tone down any critical 
coverage. The remaining shares are collectively owned by the editorial staff. The 
last few years have been especially turbulent. The long-serving CEO (since 1992) 
Yuri Fedutinov was replaced in 2014 by Yekaterina Pavlova – a journalist who had 
previously worked for the state Voice of Russia radio and was allegedly close to the 
Kremlin (BBC News 2014). Ekho’s editor-in-chief called the decision ‘unjust’ and 
‘totally political’. Pavlova herself resigned in October 2014 and in December 2014 
was replaced by Mikhail Demin – the former PR director of the Sochi Olympic 
Games Organizing Committee. Demin was dismissed in March 2015 and replaced 
by Pavlova. This ‘show’ (as the editor-in-chief called it) was only the tip of the 
iceberg in the long-running attempts to influence editorial policy. Deputy Editor-
in-chief Tatyana Felgengauer (2014, personal communication) explained:
I know too well how hard it is for us to maintain our positions. There are 
constant attempts to control us. The example with the new CEO is a case
in point. Nobody explained to us why this was necessary. The pressures
are constantly there. That’s the process of monopolisation and the 
attempts to fully control the mass media. It’s not a very recent process but 
it’s much more pronounced and visible.
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Most attempts have been unsuccessful because the editor-in-chief has been 
holding the fort due to a clever clause in the radio’s constitution that stipulates 
that journalists elect their editor.
One incident that illustrates the tension between the editor-in-chief and 
Gazprom-Media was the CEO’s dismissal of presenter Alexander Plushev in 
November 2014 for posting an ‘offensive’ tweet about the death of the son of 
Putin’s chief of staff. The editor protested against the decision. This led to a 
heated meeting between Mikhail Lesin, chairman of the board of Gazprom-Media 
and Ekho’s editorial staff at which Lesin admitted that he did not communicate 
well with the editor (The Interpreter, 2014). 
Another issue that journalists at Novaya Gazeta and Ekho mentioned was 
low pay. This was more of an issue for Novaya Gazeta’s journalists where all 
interviewees said their salaries were very low and they often did not receive their
salaries or cash advance on time. In the interviews, most journalists put on a 
brave face and claimed this was not a problem because: ‘It’s not only job, it’s a 
way of life. It’s a way of thinking’ (Prusenkova, 2014, personal communication). A
reporter summed up the prevalent sentiment: ‘The salaries here are not as high 
as in many other newspapers but that’s in a way a compensation for the 
satisfaction we feel that we cannot feel in other places.’ Some of the informal 
conversations revealed a slightly different story. A young reporter was concerned 
he had not been paid on time. He shared an anecdote with his colleague that 
illustrated the gravity of the situation. He had gone shopping with his son the 
previous day and had been so careful not to exceed his budget that when his son 
grabbed a chocolate spread at the counter, he had to ‘break his heart’. ‘I realised I 
did not have enough money to pay for it. In fact, I did not have any money and if 
they don’t pay me my cash advance today, I will remain penniless.’
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Threats and attacks
All journalists in my sample have either received threats and/or have been 
physically attacked or kidnapped. Novaya Gazeta’s journalists have experienced 
the most brutal attacks. The editor-in-chief Dmitry Muratov argued that all 
murders and physical attacks were linked to investigations on three topics: 
corruption in the special services, the North Caucuses and neo-Nazis. ‘These are 
the most dangerous topics’ (Muratov, 2014, personal communication). The most
high-profile murder was of Anna Politkovskaya.
After the death of Anna Politkovskaya I wanted to close down the 
newspaper because it was dangerous for the journalists who worked in it. 
The editorial collegiate and the shareholders (Gorbachev and Lebedev) 
did not agree. I had to fulfill my contractual obligations although I didn’t 
feel like it. Journalists still experience dangers but at least in the last four 
years we haven’t lost any lives so it’s better in that respect. (Muratov, 
2014, personal communication)
Muratov also told me that his deputy editor Sergey Sokolov (who 
oversees the investigations’ department) was recently robbed and brutally
attacked, resulting in a head injury. The attack was linked to his professional 
activities because the thieves stole important files from him. 
I personally witnessed some of the dangers journalists face. My first 
interviews were cancelled because one of Novaya Gazeta’s Ukrainian 
correspondents was kidnapped the night before.
When they kidnapped our colleague on Monday, the first thing we did is 
to start negotiating with his abductors. We were ready; I flew to Kiev 
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prepared to pay a ransom for him because I wanted to save his life. When 
terrorists are concerned, if you don’t pay, they will kill him (Muratov, 
2014, personal communication).
He had not yet reached the airport when news came that the abductors 
had released the journalist. Muratov used the services of ‘a mediator’ from a 
political party to secure the release. The kidnapped journalist Pavel Kanygin 
(2014) later told his story in an article. He was taken to a basement where 14 
other captives (five journalists) were kept by militants. His abductors demanded 
a ransom of ca. 30 000 USD. ‘This is not a ransom, it’s your contribution into our 
war’, they told him. Prior to that he was beaten by a crowd of 50 people who 
accused him of being a spy and said this was ‘revenge for our sons who were 
dying for freedom.’
Special correspondent Irina Gordienko was also abducted by local police
(as she found out later) in 2008:
I didn’t know where I was. They didn’t tell me. I showed them my press 
card but they didn’t leave me and they kidnapped me. They kept me for 24 
hours. I spend a lot of time in the Caucasus. Russian law does not really 
work there. There is no legitimacy. It’s dangerous because local forces and 
local police consider themselves to be above the law (Gordienko, 2014, 
personal communication).
When working in the North Caucasus she was frequently being followed or her 
phone was tapped. She is also used to receiving threatening emails. Similarly, 
Ekho’s presenter Alexander Plushev (2014, personal communication) recalled 
how he was persecuted by a youth group – most likely the pro-Putin movement 
Nashi. ‘They knew where I lived but they also disturbed me on the phone. They 
tried to damage my car. The most hilarious thing they did was gluing a toilet 
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brush to the roof of my car. And the glue was very good so I couldn’t really do 
anything about it.’ Plushev is also used to receiving threating and/or insulting 
anti-Semitic notes: ‘Echo of Moscow is somehow connected with the Jews in their 
mentality.’
Svoboda’s news section editor Eugenia Nazarets (2014, personal 
communication) also remembered how during a meeting of Putin’s party as soon
as party members realised she worked for Radio Liberty, they started pushing 
her out. ‘I wasn’t hurt but it was dangerous. I just decided not to fight with them 
and stepped out’. 
Similarly, Prusenkova (2014, personal communication) had experienced 
‘unpleasant’ threats such as receiving a dead rat with a big knife or a real 
donkey’s ears. Her car was once painted with swastika:
I have no fear. Maybe I’m not a normal common person. We are not 
suicidal, we are not crazy adrenaline maniacs. We are common people but 
my murdered colleagues did something exact and painful for society. This 
was the only way. If you can be killed because you do something very 
important, then it’s very needed.
Even journalists who have not been physically attacked or harassed said that 
Russia was a dangerous country. ‘You just cannot feel safe. You just don’t have 
the feeling that the government is going to help you, to care about you. You can 
only rely on civil society – your friends, your colleagues, people you know’ 
(Kurachyova, 2014, personal communication). All journalists reported they had 
either received threatening emails or letters or knew colleagues who had – from 
‘We will kill you’ (Krotov, 2014, personal communication) to ‘Go back to Israel. 
Russia for Russian people’ (Plushev & Nasarets, 2014, personal communication).
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Legal measures
A range of legal and administrative measures also hinder journalists’ work. While
spared most of the business and harassment pressures, Svoboda had been at the 
receiving end of legal and administrative measures. They broadcast only on 
shortwaves and online. Editor at large Mark Krotov (2014, personal 
communication) said: ‘It’s practically impossible to catch these radio waves in 
Moscow but it’s a bit better in the countryside where there are no buildings’. 10 
years ago Svoboda (2015) broadcasted on AM and FM waves via almost 30 local 
affiliates but ‘virtually all have stopped carrying its programmes as a result of 
political pressure’.
The future of Svoboda is uncertain after a new law was passed requiring
media companies to cut their non-Russian ownership to 20% by 2016, which 
initially prompted CNN to announce that it would stop broadcasting in Russia. 
Journalists were unclear how this new law would affect them or whether they 
would be allowed to broadcast legally from Russia. Bureau chief Leonid Velekhov
(2014, personal communication) said: ‘I don’t know what will happen. I hope 
that this won’t happen. This relation is changing but it’s changing in a bad way.’ 
Nazarets (2014, personal communication) was worried about the new law and 
her mother feared she might have to move abroad. Krotov (personal 
communication,  May 14, 2014) summed up the concerns:
We are not Russian media. We are a branch of American media. That’s 
why this law is not about us. That’s why we cannot get waves. Now the 
question is different – can we at least have an office in Moscow and will 
our website be blocked? That’s what we are worried about now. If Putin 
goes further, if he tries to gain control over all Ukraine or other
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Soviet republics, if he begins a real war, then who knows what will
happen to us. Of course, if the situation deteriorates, I don’t think we will 
have a possibility to work here in the centre of Moscow.
Even if Svoboda finds a legal loophole, another bill passed by the Russian 
Duma seriously threatens its future. It bans ‘undesirable’ foreign/international 
organizations defined as any organisation that ‘presents a threat to the defensive 
capabilities or security of the state, to the public order, or to the health of the 
population.’ Human rights activists claim this law would affect NGOs and 
commercial organisations, including Svoboda.
Moreover, the Russian state upped its efforts to tone down any critical
coverage of their role in Ukraine. Both Ekho and Novaya Gazeta were served with 
warnings that their coverage was against the law. Thus, in November 2014 
(Venediktov) the Russian telecom regulator Roskomnadzor warned Ekho that: 
‘Information is contained in the given programme which justifies the practice of 
war crimes.’ The programme was hosted by presenter Alexander Plushev. His 
guests were two journalists who had eye witnessed the fighting for Donetsk 
airport. Roskomnadzor requested the transcript to be removed from the website 
and threatened to close down the website.
Coping strategies – editors as ‘umbrellas’
The outline of the challenges alluded to some coping strategies. First, both 
Novaya Gazeta and Ekho were founded by journalists and clever clauses in their 
constitutions hinder potential censorship attempts. Journalists are also 
shareholders – Novaya Gazeta’s staff holds the majority shares while the 
journalists in Ekho elect their editor-in-chief. Thus, the numerous attempts by 
the majority shareholder Gazprom-Media to tone down any critical coverage 
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have been largely futile because of the editor’s resistance. In fact, in both 
organisations the editors play a key role.
We have a really well-organised system whereby all these {interference} 
contacts are guided to the chief editor. What happens with them, quite 
frankly I don’t know. If anybody ever tells me how I should do my job, I 
always say: Look, we have an editor-in-chief, please contact him. Anyone 
in this radio station will tell you the same thing. We are under an 
umbrella and the umbrella is Alexey Venediktov. What is happening with 
the umbrella – we don’t know, no one tells us. I’ve worked here for 20 
years and my 20-year experience has proven I can rely on him (Plushev, 
2014, personal communication).
The deputy editor-in-chief confirmed that Venediktov was ‘the personal 
protection of our radio station’ (Felgengauer, 2014, personal communication). 
Venediktov tweets regularly any plans discussed during editorial meetings 
(Plushev, 2014, personal communication), which some journalists find 
‘annoying’ but they accept the rationale – it is yet another way of pre-empting 
censorship attempts particularly on controversial issues. Novaya Gazeta’s editor 
Dmitry Muratov explained this was the most dangerous period for journalists – 
prior to publication/broadcast while the journalists were still working on their 
investigations.
Similarly, all participants at Novaya Gazeta said they always turned to 
their editor when in trouble because they felt ‘protected’ by him. Most claimed it 
was ‘pointless’ to contact the police because the situation might become ‘worse’ 
if they got involved – as Gordienko (2014, personal communication) put it, they 
‘can actually do nothing about it and probably won’t do anything anyway.’ 
Journalists often tried solving their problems by contacting directly the people 
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who had threatened them. ‘The best way is to try to contact these people to find 
where the threats are coming from: solve it eye-to-eye or find some connections 
in the Interior Ministry’ (Gordienko, 2014, personal communication). Gordienko 
gave specific examples of cases when she had received threats and had tried to 
ascertain what the source of the threat was and what exactly they wanted from 
her. Using informal connections is indeed a key approach also evidenced by the 
use of a mediator in the abduction case I witnessed. Novaya Gazeta’s editor is 
particularly experienced and he lost no time in this case. Phone calls were 
apparently made in the early hours and he travelled to Ukraine himself a few 
hours later in an attempt to resolve the issue swiftly. Other strategies included 
using pseudonyms when writing about the North Caucasus or not showing their 
press cards at some events or in some regions.
As far as their financial problems are concerned, some journalists looked
for individual solutions. Plushev wrote technology articles for magazines or 
Internet editions or hosted social events or conferences. He did not see this as a 
potential conflict of interests: ‘We are allowed to do that. Conflict of interests and 
independence of the work of my colleagues is judged by our attitude on air’ 
(Plushev, 2014, personal communication). Other journalists explained that this 
was a common practice indeed.
Conclusion
Liberal journalists in Russia experience a range of issues and challenges, which 
are overtly or covertly orchestrated or supported by the state: from physical 
attacks and murders that go unpunished to a range of financial pressures and 
laws that limit or endanger their activities. In some respects, a radio station such 
as Svoboda is in a more precarious position now than during communism. 
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Although officially allowed to broadcast in Russia, journalists are very limited – 
they broadcast on shortwaves and online only, they compete against a range of 
other liberal media that Russians more readily identify with because they are 
‘Russian’, not ‘American’, and new laws threaten their future. Moreover, a lot of 
Russians see them as the ‘voice of the enemy’ (Kurachyova, 2014, personal 
communication). Nazarets (2014, personal communication) summed up:
Many people and even official organizations in Russia take us not as 
enemies but as something that Russia doesn’t need at all. We sometimes 
cannot do something as journalists because we are Radio Liberty 
journalists. Are we independent? Maybe yes. But our possibility to do 
more is limited by Russian life, Russian authorities, Russian laws and the 
relationship between Radio Liberty and the Russian authorities.
Other journalists at the radio station revealed that a lot had changed because they 
had been undergoing a process of ‘rebranding.’ The radio’s mission was much 
clearer during communism – its purpose was to promote democratic/Western 
values in countries where a free press was banned or not fully established. The 
bureau chief acknowledged the identity crisis: ‘Radio Svoboda was a very 
important instrument in Soviet times. Somebody even said that they had the same 
number of listeners as the most widely read newspaper Pravda. However, post-
Soviet times their role changed. They had to look for a new role, a new place’ 
(Velekhov, 2014, personal communication). Putin’s second term presented further 
opportunities for the rebranding of Svoboda: ‘As Russia witnesses increasing 
control of the media by state authorities, Radio Svoboda has become a key forum 
for those who lack access to other means of free expression’ (Radio Svoboda, 
2015).
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Novaya Gazeta and Ekho also experience similar issues – Ekho’s editorial 
independence is constantly undermined by their majority shareholders and Novaya
Gazeta’s financial plight threatens its future. Covering Ukraine in an objective way is
especially challenging because they are often accused of not being ‘patriotic’ or 
being ‘traitors’. 
Liberal media are not really allowed to flourish and the fact they are 
permitted to legally operate does not mean that their job is easy. ‘The authorities 
need us. We are still alive because when someone blames Russia that there is no 
freedom of speech, they can answer: Look, Novaya Gazeta. We are like a flag of 
independent media’, Novaya Gazeta’s PR Prusenkova (2014, personal 
communication) said. This is only half the story. As Ekho’s deputy editor in chief ‐ ‐
put it, ‘They don’t just keep us for pleasure. There are constant attempts to control 
us.’ Journalists give one main reason: their target audience is not ordinary Russians,
it’s liberal-minded people and decision-makers. Exposing some of the ulcers of 
society such as the widely spread corruption in the regions,‐  Kremlin’s propaganda 
techniques and Russia’s involvement in Ukraine is something the authorities want 
to prevent without explicitly banning it. 
The increased attempts to tone down or stifle any critical coverage clearly 
indicate that these news outlets have a significant role to play in the process of 
democratisation. The Russian journalists in my sample showed an incredible 
degree of resilience in the face of ongoing challenges and pressures as well as the 
generally low interest in and support for what they do by the general public. This is 
a very important finding, because it suggests that there is at least a small group of 
liberal journalists who practice the kind of ideal journalism Western journalists pay
lip service to – in the public interest with the aim of holding the powerful to 
account. It might be indeed the case that the majority of Russian journalists are not 
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powerless victims at the hands of the state but willing participants (Koltsova, 2006;
Oates, 2013; Schimpfossl & Yablokov, 2014), but this study presents new academic 
evidence that suggests that this does not apply to all journalists. The journalists in 
my sample are members of a ‘family’ of liberal journalists who are prepared to risk 
their lives and/or accept a much lower standard of living than their colleagues 
working for state TV stations in the name of democracy. These journalists appear to
have endorsed and internalized the principles of Russian democratic journalism 
whose seeds had been planted during the glasnost and perestroika years 
(Azhgikhina, 2007). Their role in that respect is different from Western journalists, 
because while most Western countries are established democracies, Russia is not, 
and those journalists are not detached watchdogs – they are ‘fighting’ for change 
(Oates, 2013). The use of the word family is not incidental. The majority of my 
interviewees in Novaya Gazeta and Radio Ekho Moskvy said not only that they knew 
their colleagues in other liberal media very well but in some cases their partners 
and/or extended family members were also journalists and understood the dangers
well. The normalization of danger and the resilience techniques journalists resort 
to will be further investigated in future work (Anonymous). 
This study made another important contribution by providing an 
ethnographic insight into some techniques used to control media and journalists’ 
coping strategies. The findings demonstrate that the ‘breadth, depth and 
mechanisms’ (Becker, 2014: 202) of control in post-Soviet times are indeed 
different from Soviet times. While some of the challenges journalists experience are
not directly orchestrated by the state, the state’s inability and unwillingness to 
change key aspects of the political and judicial system contribute to the dire state of
freedom of expression. The lack of ‘heavy-handed’ and ‘well-orchestrated’ (Becker, 
2014: 202) ideological control does not make the working conditions of journalists 
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any easier but it at least provides some opportunities for them to ‘speak out’ and to 
contribute to the development of democracy. All journalists interviewed do indeed 
see themselves more as political actors than as detached watchdogs (Oates, 2013), 
because although they all define themselves as ‘independent’, they are clearly on a 
mission to improve accountability and democratize Russian society. However, they 
strongly objected to any claims that they were serving the interests of ‘the enemy’ 
(i.e. the USA) or indeed oppositional forces in Russia. 
Further research as an outcome of this project will delve deeper into 
journalists’ role conceptions and the identity battles they face. This study was 
mainly of an exploratory empirical nature so it will also be worth developing a 
fully-fledged theoretical neo-authoritarian model to explain the situation in Russia 
and similar contexts. This study suggests that we do indeed appear to be witnessing
‘the emerging of an indigenous Russian (Eurasian?) media system instead of the 
simple “westification” or “Europeanization” of the Russian media system’ (de 
Smaele, 1999) but whether what we are witnessing in Russia is unique or similar to
other neo-authoritarian contexts, as Becker (2004) claims, should be a subject of 
further research. As expected, rank-and-file journalists did not report direct Soviet-
style interference by the state, but a range of commercial, legal and paralegal 
measures and threats which impeded their work. These threats are much more 
direct and wide-ranging since Putin’s return to the Presidency, and even more so 
after the conflict with Ukraine started.  Russia’s importance cannot be 
underestimated because as Becker (2014: 206) points out, in many respects the 
Russian state ‘sets an example for new authoritarians everywhere’. The evidence so 
far suggests that despite the tightening grip on Russian media, it is unlikely that we 
will witness a full reversal from a statist commercialized neo-authoritarian model 
(Vartanova, 2012; Becker, 2014) to a Soviet-style totalitarian one. One question that
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this paper cannot fully address is: Is Becker (2014) right in arguing that one of the 
main differences between the two models is the lack of ‘all-encompassing’ ideology 
underpinning the state’s approach to media management and control in post-Soviet
Russia? While Russia’s current media system resembles the situation in some of its 
neighbouring countries or indeed in other Asian countries, it is hard to say based 
whether Russia will indeed lead the way in the establishment of a new media model
or indeed a new ideology in the post-truth age? These questions cannot be 
answered until a full investigation is conducted into the media systems of Russia 
and similar contexts – a task beyond the scope of this study. 
Notes
1. Freedom House labels itself as ‘an independent watchdog organization 
dedicated to the expansion of freedom and democracy around the world’. 
Some of its biggest donors are the US Department of State and the US Agency
of International Development, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Google. However, Freedom 
House’s reports of Russia have been widely criticized by the Russian 
authorities and academics for their alleged lack of accuracy and partisanship
(for a summary see Petro, 2013).
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